It is noteworthy that in the 2013-2017 Country Email List comparison, that is, between Lasso's first and second participation as a presidential candidate, where his support grew the most was precisely in those indigenous Country Email List territories. In 2021, Lasso fell back in all those provinces, but not because Correismo regained ground, but because Pérez was an electoral alternative. In the absence of Pérez Country Email List on the ballot for the ballot, where was a good part of those votes going to go?
The conceptual model allowed them to Country Email List go to Lasso. But –we underline– the general trend assumed was that the votes went to Arauz or to nullity, given what we know about the internal composition of Pérez's Country Email List votes in the first round (more than a fifth of them came from Quito and the province of Azuay), and, above all, given the informed intuitions we had in this regard. Azuay, traditionally a stronghold of Correismo and where Pérez had his best electoral performance in the first Country Email List round of 2021, helps illustrate the argument more clearly.
Arauz obtained 21% in the first Country Email List round, 23 points less than what Moreno achieved in 2017. The reasons are obvious: in Azuay, Pérez obtained 42% (Hervas, by the way, reached 15%), and Lasso achieved 14% (less than half of the 32% that it reached in 2017 in the same province). In other words, the votes of the strong bastion Country Email List of Correismo in the southern Sierra escaped Arauz in the direction of Pérez. In the absence of Pérez in the second round, Was it not reasonable to suppose that the majority of the partition of those Pérez votes –we underline “majority”– would “return” to Correista inertia or Country Email List would become null, as the Pachakutik candidate promoted?